Two studies document do-gooder derogation (putting down morally-motivated others) by studying meat-eaters' reaction to vegetarians. In Study 1 participants used negative terms to describe vegetarians in a free response format and the valence of the words was negatively related to how much participants expected vegetarians to see themselves as morally superior to non-vegetarians. Study 2 demonstrated that derogation increases when moral reproach is made salient. Ironically, the opportunity to derogate vegetarians after threat also led participants to be more open to attitudes espoused by this group relative to participants who experience threat but had no opportunity to derogate the source of that threat. These studies empirically document the backlash sometimes reported by moral minorities and trace it back to resentment by the mainstream against feeling morally judged.
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While societies may differ on what it means to be moral, they agree that it is good to be so. Yet anecdotal evidence suggests that going too far in one's attempt to be moral can elicit annoyance and ridicule rather than admiration and respect. Common terms such as "do-gooder", "goody-goody" or "goody-two-shoes" capture the negative attitude sometimes used to describe such behavior. Take vegetarians. Examples of the resentment towards this relatively harmless group 1 abound in contemporary Western culture, as captured by magazine cartoons (e.g., "I started my vegetarianism for health reasons, then it became a moral choice, and now it's just to annoy people," Alex Gregory, The New
Yorker, 05/05/03), T-shirts (e.g., "Nobody likes a vegetarian"), or bumper stickers (e.g., "Vegetarian: Sioux word for lousy hunter"). Vegetarians themselves report being frequently pestered about their choice even when they are not trying to impose it on others, to the point that self-help books have appeared to advise them on how to live among meat-eaters (e.g., Adams, 2003) . A harassment law-suit brought against a Frenchowned Wall Street firm by one of its former employees for taunts about his vegetarian diet demonstrates that this behavior can go well beyond friendly teasing, causing serious distress to the targets (Jose Martinez, New York Daily News, 1/29/09). Monin & Norton (2003, p. 566) presented initial data suggesting that non-vegetarians indeed put down vegetarians relative to non-vegetarians. The goal of the present paper is to demonstrate the defensive nature of this do-gooder derogation 2 , by relating it to anticipation of moral reproach felt by the members of the mainstream when faced with minority moral choices.
Anticipated Moral Reproach
What's not to like about vegetarians? In interviews (Adams, 2003, pp. 3-7) , vegetarians consistently report that what they eat seems to bother meat-eaters, who take 4 their culinary choices personally, and come across as contrite or threatened. It is as if vegetarians' personal dietary choice was taken as public condemnation of other people's behavior.
Any group departing from the status quo on claims of moral principle runs the risk of giving off such a perception. Sociologists of religion describe how marginal religious movements elicit resistance by threatening notions about how people ought to order their lives (see Nancy Tatum Ammerman's testimony in the case of the Waco Branch Davidians, 1993) , and by calling into question, in their behavior and structure, the legitimacy of established values (Harper & Le Beau, 1993) .
Even if the actual morality of their choice is a matter of debate, the very fact that do-gooders claim to base their behavior on moral grounds is an implicit indictment of anyone not taking the same path, because moral dictates are by definition universal (Frankena, 1973, p. 25) , and apply to everyone (Turiel, 1983, p. 36) . It is this implicit moral reproach, we will argue, that is irksome to the mainstream and which motivates the resentment against do-gooders.
Moral reproach, even implicit, stings because people are particularly sensitive to criticism about their moral standing: Not only do they self-enhance more on moral dimensions than on ones denoting competence (Allison, Messick & Goethals, 1989 ), but they also report caring more about preserving their reputation in moral domains than in task-related domains, and report being more agitated if their morality is called into question than if their ability is under scrutiny (Park, Ybarra & Stanik, 2006) . For all these reasons morally-motivated minorities may be particularly troubling, and trigger resentment (Monin, 2007) .
Ironic Effects of Derogation
One potential societal implication of do-gooder derogation is that it could prevent moral entrepreneurs from being effective at propagating their views and leading opinion and behavioral change. However, it is also possible that the act of derogating a do-gooder serves to make their views less threatening and thus easier to accept. For example, Moscovici's (1985) demonstration of minority influence suggests that deviant individuals can be put down by the mainstream (yielding little public influence or compliance), and yet have a long-lasting impact on deep-seated attitudes (yielding more private influence of conversion). Here we can imagine that defusing the threat of moral judgment by putting down vegetarians themselves may reduce the sting of their position, such that it may actually become less offensive. We therefore also test the prediction that individuals who have had the opportunity to put down vegetarians after threat will be less likely to bolster pro-meat attitudes relative to individuals who experienced moral threat but did not have the opportunity to derogate the source of that threat.
Overview of studies
This paper presents two studies documenting do-gooder derogation and demonstrating that it is rooted at least in part in participants' concern with being morally judged, and found wanting. Study 1 documents this derogation effect and provides preliminary evidence for a link with anticipated moral reproach. Study 2 manipulates the salience of anticipated moral reproach and goes on to explore a counterintuitive effect of derogation on the ability of moral minorities to influence the views of the mainstream.
Our first hypothesis (explored in both studies) is that do-gooder derogation increases to the extent that majority group members feel morally judged by the members of the 6 morally-motivated minority. Our second hypothesis (tested in Study 2) is that the opportunity to derogate do-gooders after threat allows mainstream members to be less resistant to their message, and less likely to bolster mainstream attitudes in reaction to the threat.
Study 1: Documenting Do-gooder Derogation Study 1 used a free response procedure to document participants' views regarding vegetarians. The free-response format allowed us to examine participant views without suggesting specific traits or positive or negative valence that might have swayed participant responses. To begin exploring the link between do-gooder derogation and anticipated moral reproach, we also measured the extent to which participants feel that their morality is looked down upon by vegetarians.
Method
Participants. Fifty-two undergraduate students in an introductory psychology class at a large private North American university took a one-page survey for class credit.
There were only 5 self-identified vegetarians in our sample, and they were excluded from analyses, leaving 47 non-vegetarians (16 males, 25 females, and 6 with missing gender information).
Materials and procedure. Participants first chose how they would define being a vegetarian out of four options, and then indicated whether they identified as vegetarians.
They then used seven-point scales (anchored at -3, extremely immoral and +3, extremely moral, with average as the 0 midpoint) to rate their own morality, the morality of most vegetarians, the morality of most non-vegetarians, their assessment as to how moral most vegetarians see themselves, how moral vegetarians see most non-vegetarians, and finally 7 how moral most vegetarians would rate the participant if they saw what he or she eats.
Participants were then asked to generate three words that come to mind when they think about vegetarians and were offered space to enter additional comments.
Results
Preliminary analysis of morality ratings. Valence of word associations. We dropped from the quantitative analysis of word associations three participants who did not volunteer three words but instead used the three slots to write "need more protein," "eat more meat" and "no red meat". The remaining 130 associations (we had 2 blanks) could be reduced to 80 unique cases. Five naïve judges rated these associations presented in alphabetical order on 7-point scales ranging from extremely negative to extremely positive, with a midpoint labeled neutral.
The average inter-judge correlation was r = .72, and pair-wise correlations ranged from .61 to .86, all p < .001. We computed a composite valence score for each word by averaging across the five judges.
We were able to classify 71 phrases out of the 80 unique ones provided (89%) into three thematic categories: food-related words (e.g. vegetables, tofu); descriptions of physical characteristics (e.g. skinny, pale) and words having to do with psycho-social characteristics (e.g. preachy, liberal). The complete list of generated words is presented in Table 1 , organized by content category and average rated valence, with words whose valence ratings averaged to zero making up the "neutral" category. Of the respondents overall, 47% volunteered at least one negative association, with 4% listing words associated with physical weakness (e.g., skinny, thin, pale), and 45% listing words connoting negative and/or deviant social characteristics (e.g., self-righteous, annoying, crazy).
Relationship between anticipated moral reproach and valence of associations.
Table 2 presents the correlations between participants' perceptions and meta-perceptions 9 of morality and the valence of the generated word associations. To explore the relationship between anticipated moral reproach and participants' views of vegetarians, we correlated the average valence of the words generated by each participant with two difference scores calculated from participants' morality ratings. The first of these scores represented the difference between how moral participants expected vegetarians to see themselves versus how moral they expected vegetarians to see non-vegetarians in general, while the second represented the difference between how moral the participant expected vegetarians to see themselves relative to the participant. In line with our predictions, this analysis yielded a significant negative correlation between the valence of the words and the extent to which participants expected vegetarians to view themselves as morally superior to non-vegetarians, r(45) = .52, p < .001, as well as the extent to which they expected vegetarians to view themselves as morally superior to the participant, r(45) = .41, p < .005 (See Figure 2 ).
Discussion
Study 1 shows that when they think about vegetarians, nearly half of meat-eaters generate negative associations. Giving us a first empirical insight into the causes of this derogation, our meat-eating sample also exhibited anticipated moral reproach, reporting that they thought vegetarians would look down on the morality of meat-eaters more generally, and theirs more specifically. Finally, we observed the predicted link between do-gooder derogation and anticipated moral reproach in that the more participants expected vegetarians to look down on the morality of non-vegetarians in general and the participant in particular, the more negative were the associations the participants produced. The personal nature of the threat was evident in some of the comments that respondents spontaneously added in the empty box provided at the end of the questionnaire. One participant proudly wrote, "I'm the antithesis of vegetarian"; and another, "Vegetarians, eat whatever you want to eat; no one cares. But don't give other people [expletive] for what they choose to eat."
These spontaneous reactions, and the traits generated by participants, confirm our prediction that many meat-eaters harbor negative perceptions of vegetarians. The started by rating the vegetarians first. We predicted that when participants first contemplated anticipated moral reproach, they would be more likely to react by derogating vegetarians than if they rated vegetarians with no prior threat.
In this study we also addressed the effect of derogation on participants' reactions to views regarding meat-eating typically espoused by vegetarians. Although one might predict that putting down a group might lead to a rejection of their views, we hypothesized that when it comes to do-gooders, derogation gives mainstream members the opportunity to defuse the moral threat to the self, and thus makes them less likely to reject the vegetarian viewpoint.
Method
Participants. Three hundred and eight undergraduates from a large private university self-identified as non-vegetarians completed a two-page questionnaire as part of a larger packet. Incomplete data from 16 participants were discarded, leaving 292 nonvegetarians.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, determining the position of the moral threat relative to ratings of vegetarians and scales measuring attitudes toward eating meat. In the Threat Before Ratings condition, participants completed the morality questions at the beginning, and then proceeded (on the same page) to rate vegetarians, followed (on the next page) by stating their agreement or disagreement with items probing their attitudes toward eating meat. In the Threat Before Attitudes condition, participants first rated vegetarians, and then (on the next page)
answered the morality questions, followed by the attitude measures. Finally, in the No Threat condition, participants voiced their agreement or disagreement with the attitude items prior to rating vegetarians, without being explicitly asked to consider being morally judged.
Materials. Participants first chose a definition of vegetarians among four options,
and indicated whether they consider themselves vegetarians. The threat manipulation consisted in asking participant to answer the following four questions on 7-point scales ranging from "extremely immoral" to "extremely moral": 'I would say I am…' , 'If they saw what I normally eat, most vegetarians would think I am…', 'Most non-vegetarians are…', and 'Most vegetarians think that most non-vegetarians are…'. These questions were meant as a moral threat by forcing participants to consider the gap between how they saw their own morality and how they expected to be perceived by vegetarians, priming anticipated moral reproach.
Participants rated vegetarians ('In general, vegetarians tend to be…') using ten scales inspired by the free responses of Study 1: kind-mean, stupid-intelligent, healthyunhealthy, judgmental-non-judgmental, religious-non-religious, dirty-clean, weak-strong, humble-conceited, moral-immoral, and fat-skinny. Attitudes about meat-eating were
finally assessed on 7-point scales (anchored at "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree"): 'I am perfectly comfortable with the fact that I eat meat,' 'Killing animals for food is cruel and unjust,' 'I don't think there is any validity to the position espoused by vegetarians,' 'Meat is necessary to a healthy diet,' and 'I sometimes struggle with the fact that I eat meat.' Finally, participants indicated how often they ate meat on a six-point categorical scale (labeled "every day", "every other day", "2-3 days a week", "once a week", "less than once a week", and "never"). Ratings and the No Threat conditions also reported "struggling" more with the fact that they eat meat than Threat Before Attitudes participants, F(1, 289) = 12.7, p < .001. The
Results

Anticipated moral reproach. As in Study 1, participants in both the
Threat Before Ratings condition participants were less willing to believe that "meat was necessary to a healthy diet" than either Threat Before Attitudes or No Threat participants, F(1, 289) = 8.75, p < .005. Interestingly, participants in both threat conditions believed that eating meat was less cruel than the No Threat participants, F(1, 289) = 6.39, p < .02.
Salience of threat had no effect on perceived validity of the viewpoint espoused by vegetarians or the reported frequency of eating meat (both Fs < 1).
In order to evaluate the effect of having an opportunity to derogate do-gooders on overall attitudes toward eating meat, we created a composite variable by averaging participants' responses to the five attitude items (alpha = .70). A planned contrast pitting the responses of the participants in the Threat Before Attitudes condition against the responses of the participants in the Threat Before Ratings and No Threat conditions revealed that the opportunity to derogate vegetarians prior to answering the attitude items marginally decreased participants' tendency to bolster their pro-meat eating attitudes and resulted in reported attitudes similar to those of participants who had not experienced threat, F(1, 289) = 3.38, p < .07 (Figure 4 ).
Discussion
The results of Study 2 provide support for the causal role of anticipated moral reproach in do-gooder derogation. Participants first asked to think about how moral they felt relative to how vegetarians saw meat-eaters rated vegetarians more negatively on a composite of ten descriptive traits, and specifically as being less kind, intelligent and moral than participants who answered the threat items after the ratings. Although the picture may appear bleak for morally-motivated actors, we also found that the opportunity to derogate vegetarians led to less bolstering of pro-meat eating attitudes relative to participants who were exposed to moral threat with no opportunity to derogate the source of that threat. Participants in the Threat Before Ratings condition who were able to derogate vegetarians after being morally threatened but prior to stating their attitudes about meat-eating reported attitudes that were more favorable to the vegetarian viewpoint than participants who experienced the treat manipulation immediately prior to stating their attitudes about eating meat. It appears that active derogation defuses some of the threat posed by do-gooders and makes people less likely to reject their message.
General Discussion
Two studies demonstrated do-gooder derogation in the case of vegetarians on both free-response and Likert-scale dependent measures. In Study 1, a large proportion of participants generated negative association when thinking about do-gooders. The associations were more negative for participants who thought that do-gooders would consider themselves to be more moral than the participant or non-vegetarians in general.
As predicted, in Study 2 the experience of imagining being morally judged increased derogation on a variety of traits. However, we also observed that the opportunity to put down vegetarians decreased the bolstering of pro-meat eating attitudes relative to participants who imagined moral threat with no opportunity to retaliate.
Is the pre-emptive strike of do-gooder derogation justified?
We have focused in this paper on the rejection of vegetarians by meat-eaters, based on their fear of being judged. One question that we have not addressed is the extent to which this fear of moral judgment is exaggerated. In a follow-up to the studies presented here, we surveyed respondents from the same population sampled in our studies, over-representing vegetarians (n = 24 out of 67 complete respondents). On the scales used in our studies, meat-eaters thought they were perceived as fairly immoral by vegetarians (M = -1.14, SD = 0.92), but vegetarians were actually much more clement (even if still negative) in their ratings of meat-eaters (M = -0.33, SD = 0.76), t(65) = 3.66, p = .001. It is likely that reproach by vegetarians would be even milder in a face-to-face interaction than in an anonymous questionnaire about a group as a whole. Therefore, although vegetarians do somewhat look down on meat-eaters' morality, they are much less self-righteous than they are perceived. Do-gooder derogation may be a pre-emptive strike against a threat that is significantly exaggerated.
The challenge of moral leadership
Thus far we have focused our empirical investigation on the case of vegetarians, but we believe that a similar analysis can apply to many groups, e.g., charity volunteers, green advocates, virginity pledge advocates, teetotalers, or anti-war activists. One challenge raised by the backlash against moral exemplars is how moral entrepreneurs can hope to change majority views without being derogated. In our Study 2, the effect of threat and subsequent derogation on attitudes about meat-eating suggest that the opportunity to derogate do-gooders can have the ironic aftereffect of making majority members less resistant to minority values in the face of threat. Participants who were threatened with imagined reproach bolstered pro-meat attitudes relative to an unthreatened baseline, unless they could put down vegetarians immediately after the threat, in which case pro-meat attitudes came back to baseline. We are reminded of
Moscovici's analysis of minority influence (1985) as sometimes leading to private conversion, even in the face of public rejection. Nadler & Fischer (1986) (Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess, 1997) . In this paper we focus on the perception of vegetarians by meat-eaters more than on the rich heterogeneity of the vegetarian world. We will therefore equate vegetarians with moral vegetarians in the rest of the paper because they represent the prototypical vegetarian for meat-eaters.
Furthermore, because of the moralization of health in contemporary American society (Brandt & Rozin, 1997) , being "healthier-than-thou" can carry a similar moral sting. 2 We use the term "do-gooder" to refer to individuals or groups who deviate from the majority on moral grounds, meaning that morality is the justification they would give for their non-normative behavior. We refrain from using the phrases "moral exemplars" or "moral minority," which would bring up the issue of whether a particular choice is indeed moral. The moral hypocrisy of actors has been studied successfully elsewhere (e.g., 
